Čitat ću paralelno dvije knjige koje se bave ”postmodernim”/”kontinentalnim” (možda bi dobar naziv bio ”europska filosofija”) interpretacijama Platona. Pročitah nedavno jednu knjigu od Drewa Hyllanda koja mi se jako svidjela, pa sam namjeravao krenuti na Questioning Platonism: continental interpretations of Plato (2004.), koja se bavi Platonom kod Heideggera, Derride, Irrigaray, Cavarero i Gadamera. Evo ga, Drew:
Ali, nekako mi tu fali Nietzsche, čini mi se da Heideggerov Platon ovisi o Nietzscheu, i da ono njegovo ”Nietzsche hat mich kaputt gemacht” vrijedi ne samo za Heideggerovo čitanje Platona, nego i za sva ostala ”kontinentalna” čitanja. Kao što reče Alain Badiou u Manifestu za filosofiju (11989.):
Stoljeće [XX.] je do danas bilo protuplatonsko. Ne znam ni za jedan sadržaj koji bi bio zastupljeniji u najrazličitijim i najrazlomljenijim filosofijskim školama od protuplatonizma. U jedinici ”Platon” filosofijskog rječnika koju je naručio Staljin moglo se pročitati kratko i odsječno ”ideologija robovlasnika”. I sartreovski se egzistencijalizam, raspravljajući o bitnim određenjima obrušio na Platona. I Heidegger određuje ”otklon od Platona”, bez obzira koliko on poštovao sve što je još preostalo od grčke misli. I suvremena je analitička filosofija jezika stala na stranu sofista a protiv Platona. I misao o ljudskim pravima pripisuje Platonu totalitarističko usmjerenje – upravo to je Popperovo nadahnuće. Ne bi bilo kraja nabrajanju svih protuplatonskih sljedbi, svih udaraca, svih dekonstrukcija kojima je Platon bio ulog.
Veliki ”izumitelj” suvremenog protuplatonizma … bio je Nietzsche. Poznata je dijagnoza koju je postavio Nietzsche u predgovoru S one strane dobra i zla: ”Ako se imalo razumijemo u medicinu, možemo si čak postaviti pitanje tko nas je mogao zaraziti tom bolešću koja se zove Platon, najljepšim ljudskim izdankom antike.” Platon je [za Nietzschea] ime duhovne bolesti Zapada. I samo kršćanstvo nije drugo do ”platonizam za puk”. Ali to što Nietzschea ispunjava radošću, to što napokon otvara put ”slobodnim duhovima” jest činjenica da Zapad ide prema ozdravljenju: ”Europa diše oslobođena te snomorice.” I doista, krenulo se u pohod nadilaženja platonizma, i to nadilaženje u tijeku oslobađa snagu misli bez premca: ”Borba protiv Platona stvorila je u Europi dotad nepoznato i izvanredno stanje duhovne napetosti.” … Nema sumnje da je Nietzsche, dugoročno gledano, odnio pobjedu. Točno je i da je stoljeće bilo bilo ”izliječeno” od platonizma. … Danas treba oboriti ničeanske dijagnoze. Stoljeće i Europa moraju se pod svaku cijenu izliječiti od protuplatonizma.
Svi smo oboljeli od Nietzschea i samo nas još jedan Platon može spasiti! 😀 Evo i Badioua:
Zbog Nietzschea ću, dakle, paralelno s Hylandom čitati i Catherine H. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos : Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida (1996.) Evo i Catherine:
Započinjem paralelnim čitanjem ”uvoda” u obje knjige. Najprije Zuckert:
Alfred North Whitehead once quipped that all philosophy is a footnote to Plato. That is the problem, according to the thinkers treated in this volume; the scholarly apparatus has gradually covered over and so obscured the original. These thinkers all see themselves engaged, therefore, in an excavation project, seeking to uncover the original character of philosophy in new, emphatically nontraditional studies of Plato. …
I call these thinkers “Postmodern Platos” for two reasons. First, I am arguing that their understanding of Plato is a central, if not the defining, factor in their thought as a whole. When these thinkers return to Plato to find out what the character of philosophy originally was, they understand themselves to be inquiring into the roots of their own activity. Their interpretations of Plato thus constitute essential parts of their own selfunderstanding.
The second reason I refer to these thinkers as “Postmodern Platos” is that they look back to the origins of philosophy from an explicitly “postmodern” position. That is, they return to Plato and ask what the character of philosophy was at its origins explicitly on the basis of a conviction that modern rationalism has exhausted its promise and its possibilities. They are all seeking a way of making a new beginning, of moving beyond “modernity” to something better, by articulating a new and different understanding of the distinctive characteristic of “the West.” …
Convinced that philosophy is and ought to be understood to be a distinctive form of human activity, all five of these thinkers raise questions not only about the truth of the doctrine of the “two worlds” usually associated with Plato-the world of the eternal, unchanging ideas in contrast to the sensible, changing world in which we live-but also about the attribution of that doctrine to Plato. (str. 1.-2.)
Dakle, iza taloga tisućljetnih ”footnotes to Plato”, traži se kod samoga Platona, s kojim zapravo započinje taj 25-stoljetni dijalog kojega nazivamo ”filosofija”, odgovor na pitanje o tome što to radimo, mi filosofi. 🙂 Slično tome i Hyland, uz ključni naglasak da upravo ovi ”kontinentalni” mislioci ne bi trebali nastupati protiv Platona, čak i kad nastupaju protiv ”platonizma”:
Interpreters of Plato today tend to divide into standpoints that are often regarded by each other as opposed and mutually incompatible: “analytic” interpretations and “continental” or sometimes “postmodern” interpretations. The former take their interpretive bearings from the predominantly English-speaking standpoint widely known as “analytic philosophy.” Their failure to pay careful heed to the dramatic aspects of the dialogue form in which Plato wrote, and so their attribution to Plato of the various theories and doctrines known as Platonism, is a function, in my view, of their consistent adherence to a fundamental premise of analytic philosophy that they see no reason not to apply to the dialogues. That is the conviction that philosophy is inseparable from the presenting of arguments for this or that view, indeed, in its strong versions, that philosophy just is argument. Armed with that conviction, when such scholars turn to the Platonic dialogues, where are they going to look for the philosophy? Certainly not in the dramatic portrayals of existential situations, of characters, of personal attractions, of playful teasing, of the telling of myths. No, from their standpoint, such literary accoutrements can be safely ignored, perhaps explained away in a preface as a kind of hangover from Plato’s youthful aspirations to poetry. The philosophy in the dialogues, given their construal of philosophy, can be found in and only in the rather narrowly construed arguments therein, to which they can safely turn without much attention to the various literary flares in which Plato might have indulged. In the case of the analytic tradition, then, the ignoring of the dialogue form, and so the imposition on the dialogues of the various doctrines that constitute Platonism, is at least a consistent consequence of their very construal of the nature of philosophy, even if there is no reason to believe that it was a construal held by Plato himself.
For interpreters of Plato in the continental tradition, the situation is at once more complex and more curious. On the one hand, not one of them, so far as I can see, would accept the presupposition of analytic philosophy that effectively reduces philosophy to a series of arguments for this or that position. On the contrary, one of the great contributions of continental philosophy is to have disturbed the boundaries between philosophy and other disciplines, especially the arts and literature, and so to have brought to philosophic thinking the sensitivity to literary style, to drama, to myth, to the poetic character of thinking, that has been largely missing from the analytic tradition but which is exhibited par excellence in the Platonic dialogues. …One would expect that these thinkers, when they turn to the reading of Plato, would be much more attuned to the dramatic, literary dimensions of the dialogue form, and so would not simply assume that Plato was trying primarily to assert his own philosophical views, as if he were writing treatises. Yet strangely, quite to the contrary, most of these continental writers …make almost exactly the same assumptions as their analytic counterparts, although the judgments they make on that basis may be quite different. For the most part paying scant attention to the literary and dramatic dimensions of the dialogue form (I will turn to the exceptions in the body of the book), they find in the dialogues what their analytic counterparts find: Plato’s metaphysics, Plato’s theory of forms, etc. What is distinctive about continental interpretations, however, is that they tend to see in these doctrines, and especially in their construal of Plato’s metaphysics, the very foundations of that metaphysical tradition that they strongly criticize and wish somehow to get beyond, whether that metaphysical tradition be construed as “the forgetting of Being” (Heidegger), “logocentricism,” (Derrida), or “phallologocentricism” (Irigaray et al.). So, having construed Plato as presenting his own doctrines in the dialogues, they tend to view those doctrines as the foundation of the very metaphysical tradition they wish to criticize and to the extent possible, transcend.
Because the attribution of doctrines to the dialogues on the part of analytic interpreters of Plato follows coherently from their very conception of philosophy as argument, they have been perhaps understandably reluctant to seriously consider alternative ways of reading the dialogues and so of interpreting Plato. For clearly, to read Plato in a fundamentally different way would be to call into question not just their reading of the dialogues but their very conception of philosophy as fundamentally about “arguments.” If the philosophy (as opposed to the gratuitous literary flourishes) in the dialogues resides not just in the explicit arguments but in the myths, the interactions between personalities, the jokes and erotic playfulness, then philosophy must be rather different from the way in which it is typically construed, and to rethink the very nature of philosophy on the part of a tradition would be a daunting undertaking.
But, I want to argue, the case is different for the continental philosophers I shall address. They are committed to a much broader, less limiting, conception of philosophy. They do find in literature, art, poetry, drama, rich sources of philosophic reflection. Therefore they should, by their very conception of philosophy, be much more receptive to the manner of interpreting the dialogues that I wish to espouse. I write this book, then, to challenge continental philosophers to an interpretation of the Platonic dialogues that I believe is fully consistent with their guiding convictions about the nature of philosophy, but at the same time is utterly different from the rather standard interpretations that they usually attribute to Plato and criticize in him. …If the book is successful, therefore, it should lead continental philosophers both to open themselves to a reading of the dialogues more congenial to their own convictions, and at the same time lead them to call into question their characterization of Plato—and their criticism of him—as the founder of a metaphysical tradition they want to leave behind. … I want to be clear that my critique here is limited to their claim, in effect, that Plato is a Platonist in the metaphysical sense that they wish to criticize, that the positions of Platonism are actually Plato’s positions that are espoused in the dialogues. (str. 11.-13., 15.)